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This study aims to examine the structural power wielded by the audit committee (AC) and the various bases of its power, whilst also exploring the behavioural tactics used by the AC to leverage its power in the oversight of the external audit.

Empirical evidence was drawn from semi-structured interviews with external auditors and AC members in Malaysia.

The AC’s structural power is derived from its formal and network position in the organisation. The AC possesses three forms of organisational-based power (legitimate, coercive and informational) resultant from its formal position, and these combine with the AC’s personal power (will and expert). The AC uses its personal power base to develop trusting relationships and to promote the exchange of information with other key corporate governance actors in the network position. Furthermore, the AC applies at least four behavioural tactics (assertiveness, ingratiation, rationality and coalition formation) to exercise its bases of power.

This study attempts to describe the AC’s structural sources of power, its organisational and personal power bases, and the behavioural tactics it uses when exerting its power.

The purpose of this study is to gather the perceptions of the Shari'ah committee members on what and how they safeguard and strengthen their independence in fact and independence in appearance during the discharge of their duties.

Data were gathered through semi-structured interviews with 13 Shari'ah committee members from 13 different Islamic financial institutions (IFIs).

Based on the Islamic worldview and agency theory, the findings suggest that safeguard measures within the context of the Shari'ah committee are strengthened by the following factors: presence of competencies, personal characteristics of the Shari'ah committee members, board engagement, role of the chairman in the Shari'ah committee and accountability to God. Based on the agency theory, it can be suggested that the characteristics of the Shari'ah committee and the presence of an effective governance structure are able to minimise threats to the independence of the Shari'ah committee and enhance its effectiveness.

The insights from this study highlight that proper and fit criteria need to be enhanced to ensure the independence of the Shari'ah committee members when performing their roles for IFIs. Moreover, it shows that board engagement and chairman involvement in overseeing the Shari'ah committee in the discharge of its duties is able to improve the independence of the Shari'ah committee both in fact and in appearance.

This study contributes to the evidence on safeguard measures in the Malaysian context, which is highly regulated in relation to the Shari'ah governance practices in IFIs. This evidence could be considered by other Shari'ah committees in different contexts.